| Contents |
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| THE GEOPOLITICS AND
QUEST FOR AUTONOMY OF THE ARMENIANS OF JAVAKHETI (GEORGIA) AND KRASNODAR (RUSSIA) IN THE
CAUCASUS Nazmi GUL (ASAM, Ankara, Turkey) There are a number of factors which
make the developments taking place along Turkey’s Northwestern borders all the more important for Ankara strategically. Some of these
factors involve the Samtshe-Javakheti
region: 1. The
Samtshe-Javakheti province is adjacent to the Turkish province of Ardahan.2 2. The
Turkgozu (Posof) border gate – as well as the planned Aktas (Cildir) border gate – is on that province’s
border with Turkey. 3. The
Eurasian Transportation Corridor, the Baku-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipe Line and the Kars-Tbilisi
Railway projects will all pass through that province. 4. That
province is the homeland of the Ahiska Turks
and the possibility of their return there from the places
where they have been resettled, is on the agenda. Other factors involve the Russian
Federation’s Krasnodar region: 1. Krasnodar
accounts for the Russian Federation’s entire Black Sea coastal strip. 2. Krasnodar
is the Russian equivalent of Turkey’s agriculturally, industrially and commercially
developed Marmara region. 3. Two
major Black Sea ports such as Novorossysk and Sochi are in that region. 4. The
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is active in
that region where the Kurds seek autonomy. 5. The
Adigey Federated Republic, with which Turkey has a close relationship, is an enclave situated in that region. 6. The
Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipe Line’s itinerary is through that region. 7. Both
the Samtshe-Javakheti and Krasnodar (Amshen)
Armenians are of Anatolian (mainly of
Erzurum and Hemshin) origin. During the time of the Tzarist Russia,
Georgia consisted of two administrative regions (guberniyas): Tbilisi and Kutaisi.
According to Guretski, the results of the 1897 census indicated that the Armenians accounted for 18.7 percent of
the population in the overall Tbilisi administrative region, 25 percent in the Tbilisi
province and 75 percent in the Tbilisi city. In the late
XIX th Century, that is, before Baku’s oil-driven development began, Tbilisi was the leading commercial,
industrial and cultural center in Southwestern Caucasus. And Tbilisi’s entrepreneurs,
the traders who engaged in wholesale and retail trade, were the Armenians who were also
making a contribution to the capital city’s cultural life. The 1897 census indicated
that Armenians accounted for 9.2 percent of
the total population in the entire Georgia and for 2.3 percent of the
people living in the Kutaisi administrative region. In the framework of the Armenian
migration into Southwest Caucasus in the wake of the 1877-78 war, 2,536 families migrated
to Meskheti from Erzurum, Anatolia. By the year 1903, Armenians already came to account
for the majority of the total population – 54,816 – residing in the 150 villages of the Ahalkelek county. In 1913, 41,873
Armenians were living in the Akhalsikhe county, 16,499 of them in the county seat and the
remaining 25,374 in 16 Armenian villages. When the Bolsheviks gained control in Georgia 82
percent of the population in Akhalsikhe was Armenian. But during the Soviet era the
“Armenian population/overall population in Georgia” ratio was reduced to around 10
percent as a result of a systematic effort to this effect.
In 1926 Armenians accounted for 11.5 percent of the population in the Soviet Socialist
Republic of Georgia. That ratio declined to 11 percent by 1959 and to 9 percent by 1979.
In 1926 Armenians accounted for 34.1 percent of the population in Tbilisi. That declined
to 21.5 percent by 1959 and to 12 percent by 1989. The 1989 census indicated that
Armenians (437,211 people) accounted for 8.1 percent of the population in Georgia. More
than half of these lived in Tbilisi (150,000 Armenians, 12 percent of the population) and
in Abkhazia (76,541 Armenians, 14.6 percent of the population). But the biggest Armenian
group in Armenia lives in Javakheti (nearly 200,000) and in Meskheti (1/3 of the
population).4
(On a province, autonomous region
basis/2000)
Towards the end of the Soviet Socialist
Republic of Georgia (1989), the Javakheti province consisted of two counties, namely,
Ahalkelek5 and Ninotsminda (formerly known as Bogdanovka), and the Meskheti
province consisted of four counties, namely, Akhalsikhe, Adigeni, Aspindza and Borzhomi.
In the 1990s the region’s ethnic composition changed in favor of the Armenians when a
great part of the Duhobor and Molokan Russians who had migrated to Southern Caucasus in
the XIX th Century and who lived in the especially in
those parts of the Ninotsminda county that are situated near the Armenian
border, migrated to Russia and Canada.6 Thus Javakheti has become a province
where 91.3 percent of the population is Armenian. And, in the Meskheti province, 1/3
percent of the population is Armenian. After Georgia became independent a great majority
of the Russians and, in the wake of the Georgian-Ossetian fighting, 700 Ossetians, left
Meskheti. In Borzhomi there is a smaller Armenian population than in Akhalsikhe. If we
take up the Javakheti and Meskheti provinces together, the Armenian community accounts for
40 percent of the total population in these two provinces.7 After the dissolution of the USSR,
Turkey became increasingly more sensitive to the plight of the Ahiska Turks in the 1990s.
With the “Law for the Acceptance into Turkey and Resettlement of the Ahiska Turks”
passed in 1992, Turkey agreed not only to the resettlement in Turkey of the Ahiska Turks
but also granted dual citizenship to those Ahiska Turks who would remain in the
newly-independent former Soviet republics.15 This law gave a new impetus to the
migration to Turkey of the Ahiska Turks, whose main aim was migrating to Turkey rather
than returning to their homeland in Georgia. And the former Soviet Republics where they
were living, supported that migration wave. A string of Turkish governments have failed
over the past ten years to conduct a substantial policy which could change the direction
of the Ahiska Turks’ migration – towards Georgia. This de facto situation is giving
relief to the Javakheti Armenians.16 ‘Javak Movement’,
‘Parvents’, ‘Virk’
The Samtshe-Javakheti province
(Southwest Georgia/2000) During the time of the Soviet Socialist
Republic of Georgia, the Ahalkelek and Ninotsminda counties made up the Javakheti province
and the Akhalsikhe, Adigeni, Aspindza and Borzhomi counties made up the Meskheti province.
In 1994 these two provinces – which were the Ahiska Turks’ homeland – were merged
into a single province called Samtshe-Javakheti province. Before Tbilisi reached a deal by
making certain concessions, the Samtshe-Javakheti province was being governed by the
Provisional House of Representatives. Under the agreement reached between the Ahalkelek
Town Assembly Secretary Karahanyan and the Javak movement, the House of Representatives
was to “fill the political void” created by the Javakheti Armenians’ rejection of
the governors appointed by the Tbilisi administration. Thus, in February 1991, the
24-member House of Representatives was formed by the representatives elected by the 64
villages apart from the eight representatives elected by the Ahalkelek county seat. The
House of Representatives had a seven-member chairmanship council. After President
Gamsakhurdia – who conducted erroneous policies involving the minorities, categorizing
the people as the “hosts” and the “guests” – announced during a visit to
Akhalsikhe that the Armenians were “guests” in Georgia, The Javak-controlled House of
Representatives voted on a motion declaring Javakheti’s independence but the motion was
killed with the votes of more than half of the House of Representatives members.20
On March 10, 1992 Georgia’s Military
Council was transformed into the Council of State led by E. Schevardnadze. Under
Schevardnadze’s rule the Javakheti Armenians continued to distance themselves from the
Tbilisi administration. In 1994 especially incidents broke out when a new governor was
appointed to Ahalkelek. Thus, during the period in question, the region lived independent
of the Tbilisi on a de facto basis.21 In 1994 in line with the presidential
decree No. 237, the institution of State Representatives Board was introduced in the
provinces to ensure order in the post-Soviet system. On the basis of that decree the
Meskheti and Javakheti provinces, where the Armenians live, were merged to create the
Samtshe-Javakheti province, and Gigla Baramidze was appointed provincial governor.22
The decision to merge the two provinces may have stemmed from a desire to reduce the
concentration of the Armenian population in Javakheti. On the other hand, it is a fact
that the merger has expanded the scope of the Armenians’ autonomy and/or independence
demands – which had been limited to Javakheti in the past. Since Georgia became
independent a quarrel has been underway in re the state model between those advocating
reinforcement of the central authority (centralists) and those demanding a federative
structure (federalists). The great majority of the centralists agree to a federative
structure provided that this will be limited to Adzharia and Abkhazia and, for some of
them, to South Ossetia. On the other hand, the centralists are concerned over the
possibility that if Georgia is given a federative structure this will encourage the quest
for autonomy of the minorities – Migrels, Svans, and mostly, the Javakheti Armenians and
the Marneuli Azeris – and thus lead to the disintegration of the country. The
federalists, on the other hand, argue that 70 percent of the country’s population is
Georgian, and that the proposed new system would not pose a big threat since the
minorities live together in specific areas. While the debate between the centralists and
the federalists continue, in September 1997 E. Schevardnadze charged M. Areshidze, who
supports federalism, with the task of drafting a bill on the minorities.23 The Dashnaksutun Party (known in Turkey
as Tashnak) was founded in Tbilisi in 1890. After the Bolshevik revolution it focused on
activities outside the USSR, intensifying its influence over the Armenian diaspora. The
Dashnaksutun Party’s program on a possible annexation of Javakheti to Armenia, says:
“The Sevres Treaty of Dec. 10, 1920, determined the Armenian lands. According to that
agreement Nakhichevan, Ahalkelek and Karabakh regions are parts of the unified Armenia.”
The pro-Dashnak circles had won a victory at the Javak congress held in 1996. In 1997,
partly because of the influence exerted by the Javak’s radical wing, which gained
strength after that congress, the Javak movement began collecting signatures for a
communique despite the pressure put on it by the Georgian police. The communique, which
began with the words, “Esteemed people of Javak”, argued that the creation of the
Samtshe-Javakheti was unconstitutional and called for insertion of an “appropriate
status for Javakheti” clause into that part of the Constitution which sets the
guidelines for the country’s administrative structure. A total 30,000 people signed the
communique in Ahalkelek county and 12,000 in Ninotsminda county by the beginning of
September 1997. Though the Javak movement is making “mild” demands such as cultural
autonomy, there is ample evidence indicating that the Parvents,24 which is a
paramilitary organization, has other plans for Javakheti’s future.25 The Javakheti Armenians, who at present
have all the elements of cultural autonomy on a de facto basis, do not know the Georgian
language. The Georgians living in that province, on the other hand, can speak the Armenian
language fluently. The great majority of the children in the region attend Armenian
schools. The Georgian Education Ministry officially approves the teaching of Armenian
history at schools in Javakheti. Furthermore, under an agreement reached with Armenia,
school books come from Yerevan. The students in that province later attend the
universities in Yerevan or the Armenian Language and Literature Faculty of the Tbilisi
Pedagogical Institute or the Yerevan University’s Ninotsminda-based faculty. The
inhabitants of Ahalkelek watch the Armenian TV and read the Javakheti newspaper which
appears irregularly. Schevardnadze and Ter-Petrosyan met in Javakheti in 1997. The
official communique issued at the end of the meeting said that the Armenians’ cultural
autonomy rights would be taken into consideration and that the Armenian national schools
would be treated with tolerance. Also, Levon Ter-Petrosyan announced that Yerevan would
not support any attempt to destabilize Javakheti and he had the Dashnaks’ Lragir
newspaper –which had published a series of articles on a potential annexation of
Samtshe-Javakheti by Armenia– closed. In 1998 political analysts wrote that the
government change in Armenia would further complicate the situation in Javakheti.26
Yet the new Armenian government’s policy involving Georgia does not seem to be any
different than that of its predecessor. Surrounded by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia
considers it more important strategically to maintain good relations with Georgia than
compromising these relations by acquiring a mountainous region. Though Armenia is refraining from
debating the Javakheti issue the Javakheti Armenians’ quest for autonomy is continuing.
And the pro-Dashnak Virk Organization is now leading the social movement in that
direction. In fact, on April 3, 2000, that is, prior to the April 9, 2000 presidential
election, some 200 Javakheti Armenians organized by Virk gathered in front of the
Ahalkelek governor’s office, protested Schevardnadze, and staged an “egg-throwing
attack.” Following the incident Virk leader David Vekilyan announced that they will seek
support from the “countries of the world” to ensure that Javakheti will be given an
autonomous status.27 After creating the Samtshe-Javakheti
province the Georgian authorities failed to formulate a clear cut policy as to what could
be done in the region. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Tbilisi administration,
which wants to create a Muslim Georgian population from the Ahiska Turks, would like to
make the inhabitants of Southwest Georgia too to adopt Georgian language and identity. As
if to confirm this conviction, Governor of the Samtshe-Javakheti province G. Baramidze
announced during a meeting he held with the local leaders on June 15, 2000 that all civil
servants in the province must learn the Georgian language adequately in three years.28
The Ahalkelek base is the biggest
source of employment in Javakheti. More than half of the base personnel are of Javakheti
Armenian origin – of whom 70-90 percent are, at the same time, nationals of the Russian
Federation. Furthermore, a significant part of the population in the province earns a
living by doing business with the Russian army.30 For the Javakheti Armenians
the base in question has great significance not only from the economic standpoint but also
from the security angle. The base is being seen as a bulwark against Turkey and Georgia.
The Javakheti Armenians are convinced that the base could, when required, arm the
Armenians – as in the Nagorno-Karabakh war – and provide protection against potential
internal or external attacks. The Georgian army, on the other hand, has not even been
deployed in the province.31 Irakli Batiashvili, former head of the Georgian
National Security Organization, has claimed that during the 1994-1996 period the
mechanized units at the Ahalkelek Russian Base helped transport arms from Georgia to
Armenia.32 While the Javakheti Armenians are happy
about it, Georgia is not happy at all about the Russian military presence which it
perceives as a threat to its independence. Georgia has demanded that Russia withdraw its
military presence, starting with Vaziani and Gudauta. In fact, the joint communique issued
by the Russian Federation and Georgia during the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe summit meeting held in Istanbul on Nov. 17, 1999, announced the decision for
Russia to reduce its military presence in Georgia to a maximum 153 tanks, 241 armored
military vehicles and 140 artillery guns by Dec. 31, 2000; to evacuate the Vaziani and
Gudauta Russian military bases and the Tbilisi 142nd Tank Repair Base by Dec. 31, 2000, to
close down the Vaziani and Gudauta military bases by July 1, 2001 and for the two sides to
reach a decision about the Batumi and Ahalkelek Russian military bases by the end of 2000.33 Samtshe-Javakheti’s economy Due to the high unemployment rate a
large-scale migration is taking place from the region mostly to the Krasnodar, Stavropol
and Rostov regions of the Russian Federation and to the United States.34 In
Javakheti, Armenistan’s Dram and the Russian Federation’s Rouble – since the
personnel of the Ahalkelek Russian Base use the Rouble – are in circulation along with
Georgia’s Lari. In the province, the private businesses, stores especially, prefer the
Rouble. For this reason, to ensure that people, especially the personnel at the Russian
bases – will use the Lari, the Georgian president’s office issued the Decree No. 348
in the summer of 1997 specifying that “within the national borders Lari is the legal
unit of payment.” Later, special commissions were founded to ensure the use of Lari in
the Samtshe-Javakheti and (predominantly Azeri) Kverno-Kartli provinces.35 The Krasnodar state, which comprises
the Russian Federation’s entire Black Sea coastal strip, boasting two major Black Sea
port cities, Novorosyssk and Sochi, is the Russian equivalent of Turkey’s
agriculturally, industrially and commercially developed Marmara region. A region with
moderate climate and fertile lands, Krasnodar is one of the regions in Russia that attract
the highest number of migrants.36 Since the dissolution of the USSR half a
million people have migrated into Krasnodar. Currently 78 ethnic groups live in the
region. Armenians top the list of the people migrating into the Krasnodar. Since the
Armenians living in the Black Sea regions of Russia and Abkhazia are mostly of Hemshin
origin (Hemshin is an area in Turkey’s Eastern Black Sea region), they have come to be
called “Amshen Armenians” in Northern Caucasus.37 Since the time of the
USSR, there has been an intense movement of Armenian migrant workers into the Krasnodar
state from both Armenia and Southwestern Georgia. Furthermore, due to the
Georgian-Abkhazian war, Abkhazian Georgians and Armenians – reportedly amounting to some
40 percent of the total population of Abkhazia – migrated to Krasnodar in 1992.38
Thus, by now, the Armenians have become the second-biggest ethnic group in Krasnodar after
the Russians. In order to regulate the Armenian migration into Krasnodar the Russian
Federation signed a “Resettlement of Voluntary Migrants” agreement with Armenia in
1997. However, this agreement failed to regulate the Armenian migration. In fact it led to
a further increase in the number of Armenians migrating into Krasnodar. For this reason
the Russian Federation’s Federal Assembly has postponed the ratification of the
agreement.39 The Amshen Armenians have become
organized in those cities and villages in Krasnodar with a predominantly Amshen Armenian
population and developed their relations with the Armenian diaspora. The most important
Armenian establishment in Krasnodar is the “Armenian Science and Culture Center”
called “Amshen.” The center in question was founded by the Amshen Armenians living in
Krasnodar’s Tuapse and Apsheron counties. This center was founded to provide information
to the Amshen Armenians about the activities of the Armenian establishments of Armenia,
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora and, at the same time, relaying news about the
Amshen Armenians to the Russian, Armenian, and Armenian diaspora press. The center
publishes a newspaper named “Yerkramas.”40 Tigran Tavadyan, the
editor-in-chief of that newspaper, is, at the same time, the elected chairman of the
center and serves as spokesman for the Amshen Armenians.41 The Amshen (Hemshin) Armenians, who
consider the Kuban region which includes Krasnodar “historical Armenian lands” and who
have become fully organized within that state, launched a quest for political-cultural
autonomy in Krasnodar after 1995.42 For this purpose, the Amshen Armenians,
which make up the majority of the population in a region extending from the south of Sochi
to the north of the Gagra city in Abkhazia, have gone on a quest for autonomy in Adler
which is situated on Russia’s Black Sea coast. And, to lay down the legal grounds for
that they began to strive in the summer of 2000 to have a referendum staged in order to
create an “Armenian National Zone” in Adler.43 The Krasnodar state has
entered into a sensitive period from the standpoint of both Moscow and Ankara since, along
with the Armenians’ quest for autonomy in Krasnodar, Kurds as well made demands in 1990s
to create an “Autonomous Kurdish Zone” in Krasnodar and asked Putin in April 2000 to
“give Kurds cultural rights” in Moscow, Saratov and Krasnodar.44 The Blue
Stream Natural Gas Pipe Line Project being implemented between Russia and Turkey,
increases the Krasnodar state’s importance for Turkey.45
The Krasnodar State (Russian
Federation-Northwestern Caucasus/2000) Speaking at a meeting on “Krasnodar
state’s international relations and the conditions for being accepted as immigrants”
in June 2000, Deputy Governor Krasnodar Nikolay Karchenko focused on the Krasnodar
Armenians, saying that “the Armenians see Kuban as their historical homeland, that for
that reason there has been a systematic Armenian migration into that state, that the
Armenians have become the second-biggest ethnic group in the state accounting for 38
percent of Krasnodar’s population49, that the immigrants are forming colonies
along the Black Sea coast, that in Sochi where the ethnic-demographic structure has been
rapidly altered in the Armenians’ favor the Armenian population has doubled in recent
years, that some of the executives of the Sochi-based Armenian nongovernmental
organizations have relations with the Armenian terrorist organizations, that the aims of
these nongovernmental organizations is to create an ‘Armenian National Zone’ in Adler,
and that this has created an ‘Armenian problem’ in Sochi.”50 The “Amshen” members who gathered
at Novomihaylovski, avillage in Krasnodar’s Tuapse county, on July 15, 2000, claimed
that Krasnodar Governor N. Kondratenko and his aides were inciting the Cossacks to trigger
clashes between the Cossacks and the Armenians, and, on July 21, 2000, expressing the hope
that Krasnodar will not be a region of clashes such as Chechnya, Crimea and Abkhazia, they
filed a complaint with Putin against the local administrators of Krasnodar.51
Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation’s Ethnic Organizations Congress Antuan
Arakelianda, whom the Congress has chosen as Russia’s Human Rights Envoy, held a press
conference in Yerevan on July 19, 2000 and accused Krasnador’s local administrators –
starting with Governor Kondratenko – of encouraging negative actions against the
Caucasian peoples and of creating ethnic tension in Krasnodar. He said that the Armenians
living in that province no longer knew who was to preserve and implement the laws.52 The Amshen Armenians’ efforts to
bring about a referendum towards creation of an “Armenian National Zone” in Adler,
promptly triggered a “counter-referendum proposal.” At a meeting in Krasnodar on July
22, 2000 attended by the Taman representatives, Kuban Cossacks’ unions and members of
the Otechestvo movement – which is under Krasnodar Governor N. Kondratenko’s control
– the Krimski Cossacks said that a referendum should be staged in order to learn what
the inhabitants of the “Krimsk and Abinsk regions”53 were thinking about
the Ahiska Turks, Crimean Tartars and the other Caucasian-Asian peoples [Armenians
included.] The meeting accepted that proposal. And in order to collect signatures with the
aim of bringing about such a referendum, the Western Kuban Russians’ Union was
established.54 Since it gained independence Georgia
has become a potential “corridor” for both the energy and transportation routes
extending from the East to the West. The Nagorno-Karabakh War has made Georgia all the
more important in this respect. Armenia has gained access to Russia and to the West via
Georgia. Turkey has gained access to Azerbaijan via Georgia. And Turkey and Azerbaijan
have begun conducting their unregistered commerce and tourism activities with Armenia via
Georgia. Georgia is aware of the fact that if, in the wake of the clashes in its Northern
and Northwestern regions, that is, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a fresh ethnic clash
breaks out, this time in the Southwestern part of the country, that is, in
Samtshe-Javakheti, this may lead to a permanent fragmentation of Georgia. Schevardnadze is trying to carry out
his foreign policy by establishing a balance between two groups of states: with Turkey,
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and the western countries on one hand and Russia, Armenia and some
other countries on the other hand. The EU and France have reached an agreement with
Georgia and Armenia for reconstruction of the
Poti-Hashuri-Borzhomi-Akhalsikhe-Gyumri-Yerevan-Megri highway between Georgia and Armenia.
In 1996 Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine signed an agreement to design and implement – in
close cooperation with Uzbekistan – a project for creation of a “transportation
corridor” linking Tashkent-Baku-Kiev, a project which later came to be known as the
“Eurasia transportation corridor.” The agreement in question formed the nucleus of
GUUAM.55 Construction of the Eurasian transportation corridor, the Baku-Ceyhan
Crude Oil Pipe Line Project which Turkey keeps on the agenda, and the Kars-Tbilisi Railway
Project56, are initiatives which could reduce the Russian influence in Southern
Caucasus.57 For this reason, there is the possibility of Russia triggering
and/or supporting a clash in the Samtshe-Javakheti province which is on the itinerary of
the energy and transportation corridors in question, a clash which would cause these
projects to be shelved indefinitely. Such a clash would, at the same time, indicate the
need in the region for the presence of the Ahalkelek Russian Base, and thus bolster the
base’s current status. Yerevan, which does not have diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, has two neighbors with whom it has established diplomatic relations: Iran and Georgia. Yerevan is not supporting the separatist movements in Georgia so as not to disrupt its relations with Georgia – the gateway through which it gains access to Russia, to the West and to the Black Sea. With long-term thinking, Yerevan feels happier about the newly-created Samtshe-Javakheti province – which was created by merging the Meskheti and Javakheti provinces after Georgia became independent – than it had about the Javakheti province which existed during the time of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. This is because this new province is adjacent to Adzharia – which is situated on the Black Sea coast and has good relations with both Yerevan and Moscow. Thus, Yerevan has come one step closer to its ideal of reaching the Black Sea. Furthermore, Armenia and the Javakheti
Armenians use the Sarp (Artvin-Hopa) border gate – which provides access to Adzharia –
and the Turkgozu (Ardahan-Posof) border gate – which provides access to the
Samtshe-Javakheti province – in their trade with Turkey (especially with Turkey’s
Eastern Black Sea region). Armenia and the Javakheti Armenians will get greater relief
with the opening of the planned Aktas
(Ardahan-Cildir) border gate towards the Georgian province in question, Aktas being
situated nearer to Armenia than the Sarp and Turgozu border gates. Thus, Turkey, while
trying to cultivate better relations with Georgia, will indirectly be helping Armenia and
the Javakheti Armenians.58 And the fact that the Ahiska Turks, a
natural part of the Anatolian Turkish entity, may be able to return to Samtshe-Javakheti,
is a factor which can affect the province’s future. If the Schevardnadze administration,
which has been trying to have the Russian bases in Georgia closed down, uses the Ahiska
Turks card to balance the Armenians, new incidents will be likely to break out in
Southwestern Georgia. And if Turkey continues to resettle in Anatolia the Ahiska Turks,
this will give relief to the Samtshe-Javakheti Armenians and Krasnodar’s local
administrators. In fact, Krasnodar’s local administrators have adopted a policy of
“discreetly implementing in stages a plan aimed at upsetting the Ahiska Turks living in
that province – which has strategic importance for Russia – and making them migrate to
Turkey.59 The Russian Federation, which has
become the protector of the Samtshe-Javakheti Armenians,
has only one “exit gate” left since the dissolution of the USSR:
Krasnodar. And the Russian Federation can hardly be expected to support the Amshen
Armenians’ – and other ethnic groups’ – quest for autonomy in Krasnodar. For this
reason, Moscow will inevitably pursue two different policies in those two regions. 1. In
some articles written in Turkish “Javakheti” is referred to as “Cevaheti” or, due
to the influence of translations made from Russian, as “Javahetia”. 2. Situated
on the Georgian side of the Turkish-Georgian border are the Adzharia Autonomous Republic
and the Samtshe-Javakheti province and, on the Turkish side of the border, the Artvin and
Ardahan provinces. The Adigeni, Akhalsikhe, Aspindza and Ahalkelek counties of the
Samtshe-Javakheti province are adjacent to Turkey, that is, to the Ardahan province. 3. “Meskhet”
is generally spelt as “Mesket” in Turkish texts. In
this article the correct spelling, “Meskhet”, has been preferred. 4. The
ratio of the Armenian population according to the 1989 census: Ahalkelek 91.3 percent /
Aspindza 19.1 percent / Ninotsminda 89.6 percent. Armenian sources claim that Armenians
account for 97 percent of the population in Javakheti. The Eri newspaper which appears in
Georgian (April 10, 1991) and the Panorama Nedeli magazine which appears in Russian
(No:32, 1997), said that the Georgians accounted for 2.5 percent of the population in the
Javakheti province. (B. Baranowski, K. Baranowski, Historia Gruzii, Wroclaw, 1897, pp.
170-173; Y.D. Anchabadze, N.P. Volkova, The Old Tbilisi, the City and itsDwellers in the
19th Century, Moscow, 1990, p. 33; Anorzej Maryanski, Przemiany Ludnosciowe w GSSR,
Warszawa-Krako, 1995, pp 185-191, quoted by Voitsekh Guretski, The Question of Javakheti,
Caucasian Regional Studies, Volume III (1), 1998, pp. 1-2, http://poli.vub.ac.be; Ugur Akinci, “Javakhetia: The
Next Nagorno-Karabakh?”, A Journal of West Asian Studies, Volume I (2), December 1997,
p. 1; Stephen F. Jones, Georgia: the trauma of statehood, New States New Politics:
Building the Post-Soviet Nations (com. by) Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, Cambridge Uni.
Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 543. 5. “Ahalkelek”
is “Ahalkalaki” in Georgian language. 6. The
web site of the Georgian Parliament: http://7www.parliament.ge/GENERAL/C_D/ethnic.htm 7. Javakheti
province: 1) Ahalkelek county: area: 1,235 square kilometers, county population: 69,103,
population of the county seat: 15,192, distance from Tbilisi: 278 kilometers, 2)
Ninotsminda county: area: 1,353 square kilometers, county population: 37,895, population
of the county seat: 6,944, distance from Tbilisi: 167 kilometers. The Javakheti province
accounted for 2 percent of the country’s population and for 3.7 percent of the
country’s total area. Meskheti province: 1) Akhalsikhe county: area: 1,010 square
kilometers, county population: 54,822, population of the county seat: 24,650, distance
from Tbilisi: 207 kilometers. 2) Adigeni county: area: 799.5 square kilometers,
population: 21,282, population of the county seat: 1,239, distance from Tbilisi: 236
kilometers. 3) Aspindza county: area: 825.3 kilometers, population: 13,432, population
ofthe county seat: 3,783, distance from Tbilisi: 239 kilometers. 4) Borzhomi county: area:
1,189 square kilometers, population: 38,973, population of the county seat: 17,764,
distance from Tbilisi: 160 kilometers. The Meskheti province accounted for 2.4 of the
country’s population and for 5.5 percent of the country’s total area. Geographical
conditions set Southwest Georgia – which consists of Javakheti and Meskheti – apart
from the rest of the country. Southwest Georgia has a harsh climate, getting snowfall for
six months a year with the temperatures going down to minus 20 degrees. In fact it came to
be known as the “Siberia of Georgia.” Javakheti is situated on a high plateau at an
altitude of 1,750 meters surrounded by old volcanos. Many villages of Ninotsminda too are
at a high altitude: 2,000 meters. Javakheti and Meskheti, where criminals were kept in the
XIX th Century, has always been a place for temporary settlements. In Meskheti, a great
part of which lies in the Akhalsikhe depression, there are apple orchards, vineyards and
forests. (V. Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, pp. 2-3; the web site of the Georgian
Parliament: http://www.parliament.ge/GENERAL/stat/emain.htm
) 8. Georgian
official line is one of referring to the Ahiska Turks as “Meskhetians. 9. The
Kipchak Turks who arrived in the region in the XI st Century and the Turks from Konya,
Yozgat and Tokat who were settled in the region during the reign (1573-1578) of the
Ottoman Sultan MuradIII who seized the region in the XVI th Century, made up the Ahiska
Turks. (http://www.soros.org/fmp2/html/meskone.html).
M.Necati Ozfatura, Ahiska Turkleri, 15, 07, 2000, Turkey, Istanbul). 10. The Ahiska and
Karapapak Turks in Georgia are Sunni-Hanefi Muslims. 11. In the framework of the
policy of turning the Ahiska Turks into a “Muslim force” 100 young members of the
Khsna (Liberation) Society, all of them Ahiska Turks, were admitted into the Tbilisi
Adaptation Center in 1990. At the center in question these youths were taught the Georgian
language; their names and surnames were “Georgianized”, and, after they were thus
turned into “Muslim Georgians”, they were settled in those areas of Georgia outside
Ahiska. However, the Ahiska Turks’ Vatan (Homeland) Society is opposing this policy.
Members of that society want to return to their homeland without changing their identity. (http://raccoon.riga.lv/minelres/archive//12221997-11:12:04-13789.html) 12. As of the year 2000
there are 135,000 Ahiska Turks in Azerbaijan plus 105,000 in Kazakhstan, 35,000 in
Kyrgyzstan, 10,000 in Uzbekistan, 65,000 in Russia, 15,000 in Ukraine, 2,500 in Georgia
and 20,525 in Turkey – of which 15,312 live in the Bursa province. Ahiska Turks have
settled in Turkey as of 1993 and they have founded 12 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
in this country. (M. Necati Ozfatura, Ahiskali Turkler (Turks of Ahiska), Turkey, April
28, 2000, Istanbul). 13. Quoted by V. Guretski
in The Question of Javakheti, pp. 2-3, from Ed. V. Tishkov, The Peoples of Russia,
Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1994, Y. Broiso, I. Prokhorov, Turk-Meskhetians, pp. 342-344, and
Vadim Tuttunik, Turks from Meskhetia: Yesterday and Today. This is How it Was, National
Repressions in the USSR, 1919-1952. Repressed Nations Today. Edited by Svetlana Aliyeva.
Volume III, Moscow, 1993, pp. 145-163, and Nodar Broladze, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No: 135,
July 25, 1996; Svetlana Chervonnaya, adapted to English by FUEN-Secretariat, The Problem
of the Repatriation of the Meskhet-Turks, MINELRES: FUEN report on Meskhet Turks, 1998,
pp. 1, 3, 4.(http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/MINELRES/min/meskh/FUEN_Meskh.htm) 14. Those attending the
meeting in question were Georgia’s Minister for Refugees Valeri Vasakidze, head of
Georgia’s Rehabilitation of the Refugees Agency Guram Mamuluya, Chairman of the Georgian
Parliament’s Human Rights Committee Yelena Tevdoradze and European Commission
representative Elliot Jarmando (Anatolia News Agency, Sept. 13, 2000, Ankara). 15. “The Law for the
Acceptance into Turkey and Resettlement of Ahiska Turks”, Law No: 3835, the legislation
date: July 2, 1992, the date on which it appeared in the Official Gazette: July 11, 1992,
Issue: 21281, Ankara. 16. For more detailed
information on Ahiska Turks see: Kiyas Aslan, Ahiska Turkleri, Ahiska Turkleri Kultur ve
Dayanisma Dernegi Yay., Ankara, 1995 (Ahiska Turks, a publication of the Ahiska Turks
Culture and Solidarity Association), Zakir B. Avsar and Zafer S. Tuncalp, Surgunde 50.
Yil: Ahiska Turkleri, TBMM Kultur, Sanat ve Yayin Kurulu Yayinlari (The 50th Year in
Exile: Ahiska Turks, a publication of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Culture, Arts
and Publication Board), Ankara, 1995, ISBN-975-7479-45-4.; Ali Pasa Veyseloglu, Ahiska
Turklerinin Drami (The Drama of the Ahiska Turks), Ocak Yay., Ankara, 1999. 17. Vadim Tuttunik,
“Turks from Meskhetia: Yesterday and Today. This is How It Was”, quoted by V. Guretski
in “The Question of Javakheti”, p. 3. 18. There have been claims
to the effect that Samuel Petrosyan and David Rostakyan were among the founders of the
Javak Movement and that it was led by Ervan Sirinyan. Javak created its own police force
and began collecting money from the people. Similar methods had reportedly been used in
Nagorno-Karabakh two decades ago. (Ugur Akinci, “Javakhetia: The Next
Nagorno-Karabakh?”, p. 3.; Vicken Cheterian, Ethnic Conflict in Georgia, Le Monde
Diplomatique, December 1998, Paris). 19. The Javakheti region
sent to Nagorno-Karabakh not only large numbers of volunteers but also weapons during the
war. Since Javakheti Armenians are now keeping in their houses the weapons which were used
in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Javakheti is Georgia’s best armed region not counting
Abkhazia. Filaret Berikyan who had taken part in the Nagorno-Karabakh war stated that the
Javakheti Armenians’ awareness of their “national identity” was at a higher level
than other Armenians, and that they formed their own units in Nagorno- Karabakh. (V.
Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, p. 4). In 1990 leader of Georgia’s Freedom Party
Rezo Shavishvili said, “If the Nagorno-Karabakh war had not happened, annexation of the
Armenian region of Georgia into Armenia, was going to be demanded.” (Igor Rotar,
“Tbilisi Has Only Partial Control Over Georgia’s Armenian Regions”, Prism: A
Bi-weekly on the Post-Soviet States, Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., No:10, Pt:3,
May 15, 1998, p. 1. http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_004_010_004.htm
). 20. The security belt
problem arose once again during Gamsakhurdia’s presidency. According to that new law
enacted after Georgia became independent, the security belt was to extend up to 21
kilometers into the region from the border. That meant that the best part of the Ahalkelek
county would be inside the security belt. According to Filaret Berikyan, “With the new
security belt Gamsakhurdia aimed to settle the Georgians of Meskheti and Javakheti in the
lands of the Russians living in Ninotsminda. He thus aimed to create a buffer zone
inhabited by Georgians between Armenia and the Armenians of Javakheti. That was why the
Merab Kostava Foundation had persuaded the Russians in the region to migrate and bought
their houses.” V. Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, pp. 5-6; I. Rotar, “Tbilisi Has
Only Partial Control Over Georgia’s Armenian Regions”. p. 1. 21. In the Nov. 5, 1995
election the Javakheti province voted for E. Schevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union, for
Aslan Abashidze’s Resurrection Union and for communist candidate Jumber Patiashvili who
was E. Schevardnadze’s biggest rival in the presidential election. David Rostakyan
argues that “In Javakheti, Patiashvili won that election in both the towns and the
villages. But through election fraud Schevardnadze was declared to be the winner.” In
the 1995 general election four ethnic Armenians were elected to the parliament on a
Georgian Citizens’ Union Party ticket, two from Tbilisi and one each from Ahalkelek and
Ninotsminda. (V. Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, pp. 6, 9.) In the latest general
election held on Oct. 31, 1999, Melik Rayisiyan, a man of Armenian origin who was elected
to Parliament from Ahalkelek under a majority first-past-the-post system, has become the
spokesman for the Georgian Armenians with the policy he has pursued over the past year. M.
Rayisiyan, born on April 11, 1961, is an economist. He is a member of the Georgian
Citizens’ Unity Party and serves as a member of the parliament’s Taxes and Revenues
Committee. (http://www.parliament.ge/GENERAL/stat/emain.htm). 22. The Samtshe-Javakheti
province was created by bringing together the Ahalkelek and Ninotsminda counties of the
former Samtshe province and the Akhalsikhe, Adigeni, Aspindza and Borzhomi counties of the
former Javakheti province. There are five cities, seven towns and 250 villages in the new
province which has an area of 6,412.9 square kilometers. Georgians account for a mere 9.3
percent of the people living in the province. (http://www.parliament.ge/GENERAL/stat/emain.htm) 23. According to the
Georgian Constitution which was adopted on March 24, 1994, the way part of the central
government’s powers would be “distributed” was to be determined later by
reorganizing the country’s administrative structure. And that would come after the
reorganization of the judicial system. But the proposed system could not be put into
practice. (Gurcistan Anayasasi [Georgian Constitution], Article 2/Paragraph 3, TICA,
Ankara, 1999, p. 68). The Javak movement believes that the two provinces have been merged
because of a desire to ease the concentration of the Armenian population in Javakheti.
Furthermore, a meeting of the Ahalkelek town council chaired by T. Karahanyan, decided
that the Decree No. 237 was targeted directly against the Armenians. Also, according to R.
Rostakyan: “Creation of the Samtshe-Javakheti province was unconstitutional because the
Decree No. 237 was aimed at creating a State Representatives Board. It was not aimed at
creating a new province. Furthermore, a referendum would be needed to alter Georgia’s
administrative structure.” V. Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, pp 7.9. 24. “Parvent” is the
name given to the “Paravani” lake in Javakheti by the Armenians. 25. Prior to the 1996 congress leaders of the Javak movement –which had 10,000 active members, 5,000 of them officially registered – had announced that their aim was not to gain independence for Javakheti. D. Rostakyan said that their aim was not to create another Nagorno-Karabakh, that they wanted to secure the rights of Georgia’s Armenians, that they needed schools providing education in the Armenian language, and that the GeorgianConstitution’s envisaging the granting of cultural autonomy to Javakheti in the framework of a future federative structure, was the best guarantee. A significant part of the members of the Javak’s radical wing are under the influence of Armenia’s Dashnaksutyun Party which wants Javakheti to join Armenia. The pro-Georgian wing of the Javak movement is led by the Javakheti deputy and his brother as well as the prosecutor of the province and some other local dignitaries. V. Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, pp. 8-9, 14.; Charles van der Leeuw, Georgia’s Troubled Corners-Javakheti: Karabakh Revisited, The Azeri Times, March 1999, p. 1. Asbarez Daily News Papers Archives. (http://www.asbarez.com/archives/1999/990319at.htm.) 26. I. Rotar, “Tbilisi
Has Only Partial Control Over Georgia’s Armenian Regions”, p. 2. 27. MEDIAMAX, April 5,
2000, Yerevan; Ozgur Politika, April 6, 2000, Istanbul. 28. The first reaction to
Baramidze’s words came from M. Rayisiyan, a member of the Georgian Parliament who is of
Armenian origin. Rayisiyan met with Schevardnadze and denounced Baradnidze’s stance.
Armenpress, June 20, 2000, Yerevan. 29. Irakli Aladashvili,
Russian Military Bases in South Caucasus, The Army And Society in Georgia, October 1999,
Volume 7, No 10 (40), Tbilisi, p. 5. 30. M. Rayisiyan opposes
closure of the base for economic reasons, stressing that part of the people of Ahalkelek
work for the base and sell goods to the base. The Georgian Times, June 28, 2000, Tbilisi. 31. In 1998 armed Armenian
groups stopped at the Javakheti border the incoming Georgian units which were holding a
joint military exercise with the Russian troops, and made them turn back by threatening to
open fire. Though that incident made a bombshell effect in Tbilisi, nothing was done to
apprehend the persons responsible for that incident. C. Leeuw, Georgia’s Troubled
Corners - Javakheti: Karabakh Revisited, p. 1. 32. Though Javak leaders
deny that they have a close relationship with the Ahalkelek Base where Javakheti Armenians
are employed, M. Areshidze has claimed that the arms the Parvents have in their possession
had been obtained from the Ahalkelek Russian Base with the aim of using these in the
Karabakh war. Meanwhile, Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Guram Nikolaishvili, who
has announced that they have reached an agreement on the Russian base – with the
following stipulations: 1) Russia must guarantee Georgia’s territorial integrity, 2)
Russia must help Georgia found its own national army, 3) And the armed groups on Georgian
soil not affiliated with either the Georgian army of the Russian army, must be disbanded
– is also admitting the presence of paramilitary organizations in Georgia. And, on the
security of the Javakheti Armenians, Rostakyan, one of the founders of Javak, said, “The
Javakheti Armenians oppose the Georgian government’s demand that the Russian military
presence be removed from the country, saying that they must have security (against
Turkey.] Georgia, a small country, cannot be a guarantee against Turkey which massacred
1.5 million Armenians in 1915.” (V. Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, pp. 6, 8-9,
12-13). Also, there have been claims to the effect that, led by Dorik Deboyan, one of the
Javak leaders, people have been “conscripted” from among the Armenian population in
Ahalkelek and Akhalsikhe, that there has been an intention to create battalions consisting
of Armenians equipped with the weapons of the Ahalkelek Russian Base, and that the
Javakheti Armenians have been refusing to serve in the Georgian army. Javak’s
pro-Dashnak radical wing has been putting pressure on the local people not to have the
Ahalkelek Russian Base removed. In fact, Sergey Dorbinyan, one of the local
administrators, have been beaten up due to the claims that he had demanded the dismantling
of the base. (U. Akinci, “Javakhetia: The Next Nagorno-Karabakh?”, p. 2; I. Rotar,
“Tbilisi Has Only Partial Control Over Georgia’s Armenian Regions”, p. 2.) 33. Hasan Kanbolat, Rusya
Federasyonu’nun Guney Kafkasya’daki Askeri Varligi ve Gurcistan Boyutu (The Russian
Federation’s Military Presence in Southern Caucasus and the Georgian Dimension),
Stratejik Analiz, Volume I (3), July 2000, ASAM, Ankara, pp. 42-47. 34. http://www.parliament.ge/GENERAL/C_D/ethnic.html 35. There have been claims
to the effect that after the independence Javakheti came to be neglected even more, that
the Tbilisi government did not extend loans, that western investors preferred to make
investments in Tbilisi and Rustavi, and that the province does not have a lobby protecting
its rights in Tbilisi since its deputies are pro-government. Javak leaders think that if
Georgia is given a federative structure in a way that Javakheti’s status would be
determined as well, the living standard in the province will improve and the region will
be able to attrack foreign investments. The following quote is relayed by D. Karahanyan:
“Industrial plants could be set up in Javakheti jointly by Georgia-Armenia and
Georgia-Russia and operated by using the equipment to be provided by the Ahalkelek Russian
Base. But the Georgian authorities do not view in a warm light such joint investments.
Those who go abroad to work generally find only provisional jobs. However, the fact that
the monthly unemployment pay is 8 Lari (roughly $4) in Georgia while one kilogram of pork
costs 4.5 Lari (roughly $2.25) in Ahalkelek, gives a good idea about the necessity to
migrate.” V. Guretski, The Question of Javakheti, pp. 10-11.; C. Leeuw, Georgia’s
Troubled Corners - Javakheti: Karabakh Revisited, p. 2. 36. An estimated 2,500
Turkish nationals are believed to be in Northwestern Caucasus, some 2,000 in Sochi and the
rest in the Adigey Federated Republic, for trade, for work or with the aim of settling in
those places. 37. Armenian sources refer
to Hemshin as “Amshen” and describe Turkey’s Eastern Black Sea and East Anatolia
regions as “Western Armenia”. 38. The Abkhazian refugees
in question still do not have residence permits for staying in Krasnodar. And since they
had left Abkhazia prior to the “Georgian Citizenship” law dated March 23, 1993, they
are not being considered Georgian nationals by the Georgian authorities. 39. Relayed from the
Yerkramas newspaper (Krasnodar) by MEDIAMAX, June 23, 2000, Yerevan. (http: //
racoon.riga.lv/ minelres/ archive/ 02181999-22:36::51-9764.html). 40. Yerkramas” means
“part of homeland” in Armenian language. And the name of that newspaper is the clear
proof of the fact that the Amshen Armenians see Krasnodar as a “historical” part of
Armenia. The Yerkramas newspaper, which appears in Armenian and in Russian, was founded in
1996. A3 size, it appears twice a month and has 12 pages. The web site of the newspaper:
http://yerkramas.al.ru/. The web page of the Armenians of the Russian Federation: http://www.armenia.ru 41. Relayed from the
Yerkramas newspaper (Krasnodar) by MEDIAMAX, June 21, 2000, Yerevan. 42. Armenians’
“historical rights” claims on Krasnodar-Kuban are groundless. Krasnodar’s
Southwestern (Sochi) region is the historical land of the Wubih people and the remaining
parts the historical lands of the Adige people. In the XIX th Century the Tzarist Russia
which had emerged victorious from the Caucasian-Russian war, commited genocide and ethnic
cleansing in the region in 1864 and resettled in the thus vacated lands the Slavic Kazakhs
(Cossacks) brought in from Ukraine. (For the Armenian viewpoint see: Nazmi Gul,
Yirmibirinci Yuzyilin Baslangicina “Haydat” (Ermenilerin Davasi) [“Haydat” (The
Armenian cause) at the Start of the Twenty-First Century], Stratejik Analiz, Volume: 1(2),
June 2000, ASAM, Ankara, pp. 25-28.) 43. Relayed from Yerkramas
newspaper by MEDIAMAX, July 21,2000, Yerevan. 44. There are approximately
300,000 Kurds in the Russian Federation and some 153,000 in Central Asia and Southern
Caucasus. In the 1990s, the Kurds living in the former Soviet republics have been observed
to be shifting towards Krasnodar and engaging in a quest for autonomy in that region.
Indeed, in July 1990 the Kurds’ Yakbun (meaning Unity in Kurdish) organization asked
Gorbachev to allot a piece of land for Kurdish migrants in Southern Russia (Northern
Caucasus) and issued a call for creation of an “Autonomous Kurdish Region.” Following
Yakbun’s call, 18,000 Kurds from Armenia and 2,000 Kurds from Uzbekistan migrated to
Krasnodar. Also, Kurds in Kygyzstan and Kazakhstan too began to move into Krasnodar. At a
meeting held in Moscow on April 28-30, 2000 by the PKK-controlled Russian Kurds’
Cultural Federation on the “Granting of the cultural rights of the Kurds in the Russian
Federation” theme, the government of the Russian Federation was asked to give the Kurds
in Moscow, Saratov and Krasnodar cultural rights. The Russian Kurds’ Cultural Federation
was created by bringing together the Moscow, Saratov and Krasnodar Kurdish Cultural
Autonomy Associations. (Andrew Wilson, Nina
Bachkatov, Russia Revised, Andre Deutch Limited, 1992, London, ISBN, O 233 987673, p. 123;
Kurdish Observer web site: http://www.kurdishobserver.com/2000/04/30/hab02.html
30.04/ 03.05/ 16.06/ 17.08.2000). 45. Krasnodar is on the
path of both the Baku-Novorossysk Crude Oil Pipe Line and the Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipe
Line. The Blue Stream Pipe Line descends into the Black Sea at Beregovaya near Djubga
which is situated between Tuapse and Gelincik, and, after covering an 376-kilometer
stretch underwater across the Black Sea, arrives at the Turkish coast near Samsun. 46. From Feudalism to
Capitalism , Izvestiya, July 22, 2000, Moscow. 47. While Kondratenko
adopted a policy of anti-semitism the Jewish population in Krasnodar has declined to 1,500
because of the Jewish immigration to Israel in the 1990s. Celestine Bohlen, Where Russians
Are Hurting, Racism Takes Root, The New York Times, Nov. 16, 1998. 48. In the villages of
Anapa there have been skirmishes continually between the Cossack and Armenian youths.
Relayed from Yerkramas (Krasnodar) newspaper by MEDIAMAX, June 6, 2000, Yerevan. 49. In 1997 Krasnodar had a
population of 5.7 million. According to Karchenko’s statement the Armenian population in
the region should be around 2 million (38 percent). However, the Russian Institute of
Statistics gives the Russian population in Krasnodar as 4,360,200, the Armenian population
as 241,000 (5 percent) while the Armenian diaspora says there are 800,000 Armenians (16
percent) in Krasnodar. (MPA News Agency, July 6, 2000, Baku. 50. Karchenko’s statement
appeared in the June 6,2000 issue of the Kuban News (Krasnador) newspaper . MEDIAMAX, June
23,2000 Yerevan. 51. Relayed from Yerkramas
newspaper by MEDIAMAX, July 26, 2000, Yerevan. 52. Noyan Tapan, July 20,
2000, Yerevan. 53. Krimsk and Abinsk are
two towns situated to the north of Novorssysk in the Krasnodar state. 54. (Relayed from Yerkramas
newspaper by MEDIAMAX, July 26, 2000, Yerevan), The Ahiska Turks are one of the targets in
Krasnodar for the growing Russian chauvinism. Yusuf Sarvarov, chairman of the Ahiska
Turks’ Vatan Association in Moscow, told a press conference in Moscow on March 6, 1998,
thatthe Cossacks’ racist approach constituted a dangerous factor in Krasnodar. Until
1989 there were 2,135 Ahiska Turks in Krasnodar. Following the Uzbekistan-Fergana
incidents this number rose to 17,000 at settlements without residence permit (propiskas).
This increase over the past decade has upset the Russian nationalists. And the Ahiska
Turks have been faced with the “soft ethnic cleansing” efforts of the paramilitary
Cossack groups who accuse them of desiring to set up an Islamic state in Krasnodar. http://www.soros.org/fmp2/html/meskone.html;
www.soros.org/fmalert/0245.html) 55. On Sept. 1996 Armenian
Minister of Communications and Transport Genrik Kochinyan briefed the Armenian Parliament
on the highway agreement the EU and France had concluded with Georgia and Armenia. Relayed
from the Sept. 14, 1996 issue of the Lragir newspaper by V. Guretski, The Question of
Javakheti, p. 12; for GUUAM and the other quests for cooperation in the Caucasus, see:
Hasan Kanbolat and Gokcen Ekici, 21. yy’da Kafkasya’da Isbirligi Arayislari ve
Ekonomik Boyutlari (Quests for Cooperation in the Caucasus in the 21th Century and its
Economic Dimensions), Jeo-Ekonomi, Volume II (2-3), Summer-Autumn 2000, ISSN: 1302-261X,
ASAM, Ankara. 56. The potential itinerary
of the Kars-Tbilisi Railway: In Turkey: Cildir; in Georgia: Ahalkelek (Armenian) - Tsalka
(Armenian) - Merneuli (Azeri) - Tbilisi (Georgian), (* The words in parenthesis indicate
the ethnic character of these settlements.) In Georgia the existing railway system
provides railway access all the way to Ahalkelek and, in Turkey, the Turkish railway
system reaches Kars. So it would be better to call the project the “Kars-Ahalkelek
Railway Project”. 57. Initially it was
planned to have the Baku-Ceyhan Pipe Line to cross through Akhalsikhe which is situated to
the northwest of Ahalkelek. Later the Javakheti valley, which is highly suitable for the
construction of pipe lines and railways, was preferred since the unsuitable geological
characteristics of the Akhalsikhe region would push up the project’s cost. The
Kars-Tbilisi (Turkey-Georgia) Railway Project, which is being planned on an East-West
transit axis, will extend for a total 124 kilometers. Of the railway line, a 92-kilometer
stretch building a new railway across Javakheti. Javak leader Sirinyan, who opposes the
Kars-Tbilisi Railway Project, has claimed that this project is aimed at reducing the
Armenian population in the region. (U. Akinci, “Javakhetia: The Next
Nagorno-Karabakh?”, pp. 2,3; Tekin Cinar, Ulastirma Bakanligi E. Mustesar Yrd.’nin
raporu (report prepared by deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Communications and
Transport), (http://www.dusunenadam.com.tr/demiryol6.htm
) 58. Georgia and the Turkish
businessmen in Georgia support the opening of the Aktas border gate. Cecenistan Ile Ilgili
Rapor, Gurcistan’daki Turk Isadamlari Ile Gorusme Tutanagi, TBMM Insan Haklari Komisyonu
Yay. (Report on Chechnya, The Minutes of the Meeting with Turkish Businessmen in Georgia,
a publication of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Committee), February
2000, Ankara, p. 157. 59. Alexander Ossipov, The
Memorial Human Rights Centre, Moscow, http://raccoon.riga.lv/minelres/archives//12021998-22:52:06-8560.html |
