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| INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND HEGEMONIC POWERS: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS Afiz ALIYEV (Khazar University, Baku, Azerbaijan) The study of international regimes has been in fashion among scholars since late 1970s-early 1980s. Academically speaking, it has been one of the most interesting areas of study within the IR discipline, and accordingly, the existence of international regimes has been considered as being in conformity with the prevailing IR paradigms. The continuing trend led many scholars in the field to write articles and books on regimes in various issue-areas of international relations, such as, security, trade, finance, environmental politics, and so on.
What has been
interesting about these regime studies is that the definitions of ‘regimes’ used by
different scholars have sometimes been sharply different from each other. So, they have
not used a uniform definition of international regimes, and this creates a kind of
conceptual confusion about what one should and should not mean by, and understand from,
regimes. In order to avoid any such confusion, and for the purpose of simplicity, I will
take Stephen D. Krasner’s conventional definition of regime, for a start, and elaborate
on it in line with my arguments.
The main reason
for my borrowing his definition is that, as he himself argues, it is the broadest
conception of regimes that “is consistent with other recent formulations”. Thus,
regimes, in Krasner’s terms, are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a
given area of international relations”. (Krasner, 1983, p.2)
One of the
major issues in regime studies is the role of hegemonic state(s) in establishing and
maintaining international regimes. Some scholars, such as those of Grotian perspective,
deem it to be not essential for the persistence of regimes, whereas, some others,
especially those of structural approach consider the role of the hegemonic power(s) vital.
Both sides justify their arguments well on their own terms and from their own
perspectives.
My main aim in
this article is to examine the role of hegemonic power(s) in regime formation and
persistence, using examples from international economic and environmental regimes and by
approaching the concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘regime’ from a different perspective.
Some regime
theorists, especially, the Neo-liberal Institutionalists, take this argument further to
issue-areas in IR. They, again, from state-centric perspective, differentiate between
relative powers of states on particular issues, and maintain that stronger states in a
given issue-area dominate the other (weaker) states and determine the rules of the game
(i.e. norms, principles, rules, etc.) (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp.50-51) Thus, for them,
the formation and structuring of a regime depends, to a certain extent, on the power,
interests and objectives of the hegemonic state(s). For example, in Ruggie’s famous case
of regime change from orthodox to ‘embedded’ liberalism in mid-1940s, the US acted as
a hegemonic power: first, by setting the rules and institutions of the ‘embedded’
liberal economic regime; second, by backing up the functioning of the system, using its
economic and financial might; and third, by achieving the consent and/or compliance of
other states, except the socialist bloc, to the newly-established economic order.
Krasner borrows
the argument by Charles Kindleberger that one of the main reasons of the Great Depression
was the lack of a hegemonic state to lead the world economy. In the interwar years, the
USA was able but unwilling to provide economic order in the world, while Great Britain was
willing but unable to do that. (Krasner, 1983, p.14)
While most of
these regime theorists accept the essential role of hegemonic states in establishing
regimes, they split into two groups when it comes to their persistence. For example, Oran
Young talks about imposed regimes and argues
that such regimes collapse together with a major decline in the power of the hegemon that
imposes and sustains them. Stein, on the contrary, argues that the decline of the
hegemonic state does not really matter. Collective interests alone can effectively sustain
a regime. (Krasner, 1983, p.15) What is
misleading in both of the above perspectives is that, being state-centric, they ignore
major changes in global economic, political and social structures.
The argument
becomes even clearer when one examines regime formation and persistence in environmental
issues. In his article, “Politics Beyond the State”, Paul Wapner argues that the role
of transnational environmental activist groups (TEAGs) in bringing environmental issues
into political agenda has been much higher than the role of the state. He adopts the fluid approach to the analysis of environmental
politics and maintains that TEAGs, as independent actors, are more successful in creating
environment-friendly societies, by enlightening them about the significance of
environmental problems, than the state is. They have, sometimes, effectively altered
buying and consumption habits of individuals; thus pressurising companies to produce what
environment-friendly people would buy. The main domain that they manipulate is not
inter-state arena, but the international civil society. (Wapner, 1995, pp.322-336)
So, in the case
of environmental politics, some rules, norms, etc. are formulated not by states, but by
some other actors, be them individuals, groups or NGOs. This means, environmental regimes
are not creatures of states.
While
talking about the increasing trend of negotiating global environmental regimes since 1980,
Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown argue that there has been no role of any hegemonic
state in that increasing trend. Firstly, because there was no hegemonic power in
environmental issue-area due to the nature of the issue. Secondly, because the US hegemony
was declining since early 1970s. So, by 1980s, there was no hegemonic power to back up the
environmental regimes. But despite the lack of a hegemonic state and the “US ideological
hostility toward international environmental regulation”, many global environmental
regimes have been negotiated successfully. (Porter and Brown, 1991, pp.19-24)
The question
that arises here is, then, to what extent these international regimes, negotiated or
established in the absence of a hegemonic power, work as effectively as the ones supported
by hegemonic powers? The answer to this question is certainly negative, i.e. international
environmental regimes mostly do not function as effectively as other regimes. The degree
of compliance to environmental regimes is, by and large, low. On some vital issues, such
as climate change and biological diversity, there are not even established regimes.
(Porter and Brown, 1991, pp.21-22; Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992, p.22) However, when we
look, for example, to international economic regimes, we can see that they are doing well;
at least, better than environmental regimes.
Thus, the
hegemony, probably, does have something to do with the persistence or effective working of
regimes. But is it necessarily hegemony of state(s)? The answer to this question will also
clarify whether or not regime study is an effective way of understanding what is taking
place in the world.
At this point,
it is worth going back to Krasner’s definition of regime. Hedley Bull, in his famous
book, The Anarchical Society, rightly argues
that norms, rules and institutions, i.e. Krasner’s regimes, are the means by the help of
which order is achieved and maintained in
international arena. (Bull, 1977, pp.53-76) It can be argued, therefore, that what regime
theorists call ‘international regimes’, are just issue-specific components of a
broader and all-inclusive international order. Thus, regime studies can not be kept
separate from, and actually should be conducted in conjunction with, the study of the
general world order, which itself is an outcome and an element of the global
political-economic structure.
The emergence
of the global political-economic structure, as many Marxist scholars have argued, was
associated with the expansion of the capitalist mode of production on a world-wide scale,
beginning from XVIII – XIX centuries. This expansion has been not only about the mode of
production alone, but also about the values, norms and rules that sustained it. So,
together with the mode of production, division of labour, market relationships and the
liberal-capitalist order has expanded globally as well.
Accordingly,
the founders and supporters, as the main beneficiaries, of this order have always been
seeking to strengthen it, because it serves their interests. And as I borrowed from Bull
above, an effective way of maintaining an order is to achieve compliance/consent of others
to the norms and rules of that order. The institutionalisation of those norms and rules,
is a further step towards the strengthening and persistence of that order. As order
progresses further, it develops its own issue-specific norms and rules (and in some cases
institutions) to deal with its own consistent issues more effectively. These norms and
rules are always in conformity with the general order. Thus, in the modern world, all
issue-specific norms, rules and institutions, i.e. regimes, should be consistent with the
general ones and the existing liberal-capitalist order.
From this
perspective, Ruggie’s famous story of a “revolutionary change” from orthodox to
“embedded” liberal regime (Ruggie, 1983, pp.195-231) could be re-interpreted. As the
label indicates, it was a ‘liberal’ regime anyway, and was in conformity with the
existing liberal-capitalist order. In his article, he talks about changes in the
principles and norms of the regime, which he refers to as the change of the regime itself,
but he does not examine whether or not those changes altered the mode of production, the
principle of private property and the existing liberal-capitalist world order.
One could, on
the contrary, refer to that change as the strengthening of liberal-capitalist order, and
its adaptation to the new circumstances, for the following reasons: First, the change was
accompanied by the establishment of international economic institutions, such as IMF, IBRD
and GATT, which strengthened the existing liberal-capitalist order even more. Second, in
the face of the economic difficulties of the recovery from the damages of the Second World
War, and vis-a-vis the expansion of the Soviet (state capitalism) influence towards the
West, intervention of the Western states in their economies, seems to have been the best
way of sustaining the liberal-capitalist order.
By the same
token, the discussions about the rise and collapse of the Gold Standard System or of
Bretton Woods System have to be carried within the general context of the evolution of the
capitalist system. Have any of these changes led to an essential change in the global mode
of production, in the position of bourgeoisie and labour in that mode or in the world
capitalist structure? The answer is obviously negative. In sum, regimes are the means of the hegemonic powers in the global capitalist structure. They are established to help with the persistence of international order. They may rise and fall, when necessary, but the order continues. Thus, to understand world affairs in an historical continuum, one should look at the global structure and order, rather than particular fragments of that order, which are labelled as ‘regimes’ by some scholars.
Having said all
these, I will now move on to the next stage of my argument. As the issue of hegemony
matters the formation and persistence of international regimes, and taking into account
that it takes place within the global capitalist structure and order, whose hegemony is it
that matters?
Gramsci and his
followers have already shown that in developed capitalism, bourgeoisie constructs its
hegemony through civil society by uniting with their historical social allies, promoting
some minor interests of society at large, and finally, persuading the substantial part of
society to give their consent to its hegemony. The state – the political society, which
is dependent on civil society (at least because governments need votes and support of
their populations) thus becomes nothing more than a tool for the implementation of
policies designed in the civil society. As the civil society is the domain of bourgeoisie,
whatever policy is consented upon in the civil society necessarily serves, or at least
does not violate, the interests of the bourgeois class. (Augelli and Murphy, 1993, pp.
128-132) And the corollary of the interests of bourgeoisie is naturally the preservation
of the existing liberal-capitalist order, because it enables bourgeoisie to sustain its
hegemony in the mode of production. They further argue that in international arena the
bourgeois class has constructed its hegemony in the same way: in alliance with its
historical social allies, and through international civil society.
So, when we
talk about international order, together with its regimes, and the role of hegemonic
powers, we have to consider to what extent state-centric, anarchy-based views limit and
mislead our explanations: States, being constructions of people, can not have interests,
separate from the interests of those who construct and maintain them. Construction of the
state can never be an end itself. The state is a means to serve interests of people.
As far as the
interests of people is concerned, as I mentioned above, in capitalist societies, the
interest of bourgeoisie always have priority over that of others. But this should not mean
that the interests of others are not served at all. They can be tolerated to the extent
they do not challenge the hegemony of bourgeoisie, the existing order and the fundamentals
of the capitalist mode of production.
If the above
put arguments are true, then what kind of imagined anarchy are we talking about? The
concepts of hegemony and hegemonic order necessitate and bring about hierarchy rather than
anarchy. If the economic-social, and thus political, hierarchy is (in Rosenberg’s terms)
‘impersonalised’ and covered under the concept of sovereignty, this should not mean
that it does not exist at all.
Having set my
theoretical assumptions that 1) international regimes are nothing but consistent parts of
the global order; 2) this order is liberal-capitalist in nature and is aimed at upholding
capitalist mode of production; 3) the bourgeoisie of the advanced world has constructed
its global hegemony through the existing world order; 4) the order is hierarchical rather
than anarchical in nature, I would like to discuss the role of the hegemon(s) in
establishing and sustaining issue-specific components of international order, that is
regimes. The discussion will also reveal why some regimes are strong (well functioning),
whilst some others are not. Global Hegemony with Illustrations
The three
pillars of the international economic order, namely trade, monetary and development
regimes, with their respective institutions – GATT/WTO, IMF and World Bank – have been
mainly seeking the preservation of liberal-capitalist order and the expansion of the
Neo-liberal ideology since their establishment in 1940s. Each of these institutionalised
regimes manage one aspect of the preservation/improvement task of the international
economic order.
When one looks
at the principles and policies of, for example, the IMF, s/he can easily see that the
organisation is not necessarily about solving the problems of its member countries, but
making sure that those are not taking an economic path other than liberal-capitalism. This
is evident in the well-known ‘IMF surveillance’ and the ‘conditionality’ of IMF
funding. (Gill, 1995, pp.412-413) From this angle, the ‘IMF surveillance’ can be
interpreted as “the IMF’s surveying whether or not a member country is violating
principles and norms of the liberal-capitalist order in its domestic economic practice”,
and the ‘conditionality’ of IMF programmes is a means of making sure that it is not
doing so. That is why, money from the IMF comes only if the troubled country accepts to
put forward Neo-liberal economic policies, by cutting down budget expenditures on social
issues, such as, education, public pensions, etc. In other words, the ‘conditionality’
principle is a means of achieving compliance of member countries to the prevailing
Neo-liberal order.
Since the
bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist societies is the leader of the world bourgeois
class, the developed states, i.e. the political societies of the developed world
dominates, controls and manipulates the economic regimes as means of maintaining the
international economic order. Thus, whenever, an economic regime fails to provide order,
developed states are first to be alarmed and to reform/improve/change the regime. Stephen
Gill points out that “after the failure of the existing methods of surveillance was
revealed by the Mexican crisis of 1994-95” G7 states, gathering in Canada in June 1995,
“opted to strengthen surveillance mechanisms under the aegis of the IMF, WB and
BIS…” (Gill, 1995, p. 413)
As the
maintenance of order depends heavily on the expansion and dominance of the hegemonic
ideology, some economic regimes appear to be more ideological than functional. For
example, GATT, since its foundation, has been an arena for confrontation between the
bourgeois classes of different societies. It has been so, not only for North – South
confrontation, but also for NAFTA –EU, US – Japan confrontations. It is very natural
that the bourgeois class in each and every country seek their own profit when it comes to
the issues, like market, exchange, terms of trade, etc. Therefore, every country argues
for maximising its own profits in GATT/WTO negotiations and rounds. We have witnessed that
even the original and most enthusiastic supporters of liberal trade – the Europeans and
Americans – come to be the most protectionist countries in practice. To be honest, the
rest are not very much open to trade either. It is primarily because of the fact that
trade issues affect the profits of bourgeoisie directly.
Susan Strange
rightly argues that when we look at the quantitative arrangements (such as quotas,
Voluntary Export Restrictions and Orderly Marketing Arrangements) and some agreements such
as the 1978 Multi-Fibre Agreement, we see that they are simply “agreements to
disagree”, because they put rather than remove barriers to trade. (Strange, 1983, p.350)
Thus, as far as free trade is concerned, GATT is more ideological than functional. The
bourgeois classes of different countries may confront each other at various points
regarding market shares, profits and so on. However, they are aware that the existing
liberal-capitalist order serves their interest best. That’s why, despite competition and
confrontation, they come together in GATT and even sign protectionist agreements under the
auspices of GATT, thus keeping rivalry and protectionism within the limits of the existing
order.
In
environmental regimes too, the preservation of the existing order appears to be the first
priority. Many scholars in the field have already argued that major environmental issues
can not be handled separately from international economic issues. For example, Hurrell and
Kingsbury talk about the interconnection between economic development and environmental
issues (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992, pp.35-45), and Porter and Brown argue that the
solution of environmental problems through the establishment of effective international
regimes will depend on the solution of North – South issue, which is basically economic.
(Porter and Brown, 1991, p.124-127)
Due to the fact
that all world events take place within the existing liberal-capitalist order,
environmental issues and their solution are subject to the hegemony of bourgeoisie.
Therefore, only those solutions to environmental problems that do not violate the
bourgeois interests come true. To put it using the terms of regime theorists, only those
regimes and regime negotiations which are not contrary to Neo-liberal norms and principles
can be successful.
But
unfortunately, the most important environmental problems, such as CFC production,
deforestation and destruction of ecosystems, are mainly related to the persisting poverty
and economic backwardness of the underdeveloped and developing parts of the world. As
such, their solution can be achieved in two ways: 1) through redistribution of wealth, in
which case the bourgeoisie of the advanced parts of the world will have to sacrifice their
interest; 2) through developing the backward parts of the world, which needs transfer of
technology and capital from the advanced parts of the world. These seem to be the only
possible ways, for now, leading to the environment-friendly ‘sustainable development of
the world’. (Porter and Brown, 1991, p.32)
The above ways
are contrary to the interests of bourgeoisie in the advanced world, not only because they
minimise their profits, but also because they are contrary to the logic and principles of
the existing order. For this reason, in environmental negotiations the advanced countries,
except Nordic and few European countries, have always been reluctant to give any kind of
non-liberal concessions. The USA, with the toughest bourgeoisie in the world, has, by and
large, opposed any demand from developing countries that was contrary to the
liberal-capitalist order. Again, the concern of the USA has been not only about material
and/or financial losses, but also about preservation of Neo-liberal principles.
For example,
when developing countries proposed the creation of an independent fund (with the
contribution and under the control of the signatories of the Montreal Protocol) for
assisting developing countries in introducing substitute technologies for CFCs, the USA
opposed it. It withdrew from its opposition under international pressure a few days before
1990 London Conference, but “insisted that the
funding should not be considered as a precedent for dealing with other global issues”.
(Porter and Brown, 1991, p.132) Although this case was not so much contrary to the
existing order, the US representatives feared that this could be taken as a precedent for
any kind of redistribution or transfer of resources in the future, because that would mean
the erosion of the norms and principles of the existing order.
Thus, the main
reason for the weakness of environmental regimes is that their creation and persistence is
neither vital for bourgeoisie, nor consistent with the liberal-capitalist order. It is not
consistent, because the Neo-liberal thinking excludes the possibility of depletion of
resources and emergence of environmental problems. (Porter and Welsh, 1991, p.27)
Accordingly, the founders and successors of this order have never created any mechanism
for managing environmental issues. They probably have never thought that the order might
face problems coming not from individuals and social forces, but from outside human sphere
of action, from nature itself. If they knew they would certainly create issue-specific
mechanisms (i.e. regimes) for dealing with it. In other words, they would include
environmental issues in their conception of order.
In that sense,
the introduction of environmental issues to the liberal-capitalist order was a real
“revolutionary” change, at least for three reasons: First, unlike the change from
orthodox to “embedded” liberal system, environmental politics did not have any
ideological connections to the existing order. In other words, the environmental issues
unexpectedly rushed into the order in ideological and philosophical sense. Second, it was
not introduced by the hegemonic class, but by lower civil groups – by masses. Thus, it
was an indicator of the increasing mass conscience. And the last, it showed the weakness
of the existing order and put an end to the liberal myth about the welfare of all mankind.
It also revealed to what extent the Neo-liberal ideology is environmentally dangerous, or
in Stephen Gill’s words, “ecologically myopic”.
In brief, environmental
problems are among the strongest challenges to the existing global system and world order.
If the system is strong enough, it will develop its own mechanisms, to solve these
problems. If it does not, then probably that will be the beginning of the change of the
system itself…
Secondly, the
role of hegemonic powers in creating and maintaining international order, and thus,
international regimes, is paramount. However, defining ‘hegemonic powers’ from
state-centric perspective is very confusing. Analyses of the whole world structure,
together with its economic-social bases, give deeper explanations to the events taking
place in international arena than the state-centric approaches do. It is simply because of
the fact that the hegemony of social forces (in the contemporary world, hegemony of the
bourgeoisie) is a more deep-rooted structural phenomenon in world politics than the
hegemony of states is.
And lastly,
since the international order is to serve the interests of the hegemonic social forces or
the hegemonic class, regimes, as issue-specific parts of it, are not supposed to
contradict or put obstacles to the general functioning of the hegemonic order.
Accordingly, the hegemonic class is eager to support only those regimes that contribute to
the maintenance and strengthening of the order. The strongest regimes are those which are
vital for the hegemon(s) in sustaining the order, because they get the strongest support
from the hegemonic power(s). From this perspective, emergence of a particular regime
contrary to the interests of the hegemonic class would necessarily contribute to the
weakening of the existing order, thus creating possibilities for a positive change in the
global structure… Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society (London, Macmillan, 1977) Gill, Stephen. “Globalisation,
Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism” in Millennium (Vol.24, No.3, 1995) pp.399-423. Hurrell, A. &
Kingsbury, B. (Eds.) The International Politics of the Environment
(Oxford, Caledonian Press, 1992) Keohane, Robert O. &
Nye, Joseph S. Power and Interdependence (Boston, Little Brown,
1977) Krasner,
Stephen D. “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening
variables” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International
Regimes (Ithaca and London, Cornell Univ. Press, 1983) Porter, G. & Brown,
J.W. Global Environmental Politics (Boulder, 1991) Rosenberg, Justin. The Empire of Civil Society (London, Verso, 1994) Ruggie,
Gerard J. “International regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in
the postwar economic order” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes (Ithaca and London, Cornell
Univ. Press, 1983) Strange,
Susan. “Cave! hic dragons: a critique of
regime analysis ” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International
Regimes (Ithaca and London, Cornell Univ. Press, 1983) Wapner, Paul. “Politics Beyond the
State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics” in World Politics (No.47, April 1995) |
